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Your November 3 ballot

ProConWiki never tells you how to vote. Each measure below shows what the official voter guide says it does, then the evidence people cite on each side.

County: San Francisco Orange County Alameda County Santa Clara County

Proposition 1 · Proposition 2 · Proposition 3 · Proposition 4 · Proposition 5 · Proposition 37 · Proposition 38 · Proposition 39 · Proposition 40 · Proposition 41 · Proposition 42 · Proposition 43 · Proposition 44 · Proposition 45 · Proposition A (San Francisco) · Proposition B (San Francisco) · Proposition C (San Francisco) · Proposition D (San Francisco) · Proposition E (San Francisco) · Proposition F (San Francisco) · Proposition G (San Francisco) · Proposition H (San Francisco) · Proposition I (San Francisco) · Proposition J (San Francisco) · Regional Measure RTM (San Francisco Bay Area)

How to vote

Your ballot at a glance

Aldo's short version: one line per measure, quoted from the official text. Tap through for the full information on each.

  1. Proposition 1YES: The state could borrow $11.25 billion to support veterans and affordable housing. NO: The state could not borrow $11.25 billion to support veterans and affordable housing.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  2. Proposition 2YES: Rules for building state budget reserves and paying down extra state debts would change. As a result, state budget reserves would be higher. The state also would be required to make extra debt payments for longer. NO: Rules for building state budget reserves and paying down extra state debts would not change.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  3. Proposition 3YES: An income tax increase on high-income earners in place since 2012 would become permanent instead of expiring in 2031. NO: An income tax increase on high-income earners in place since 2012 would expire in 2031.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  4. Proposition 4YES: State and local governments could create public campaign financing programs for public office candidates, subject to limits on which public funds could be used, how the public funds could be used, and who could receive them. NO: State and most local governments would remain unable to create public campaign finance programs for public office candidates.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  5. Proposition 5YES: Recall elections would no longer include a question about who should fill the vacancy. Instead, vacancies typically would be filled through special elections or appointments, depending on the office and timing. NO: Voters would continue to be asked who should fill the vacancy as part of recall elections.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  6. Proposition 37YES: The state would create a new homebuying assistance program. The state could sell up to $25 billion in revenue bonds to fund the program. Bonds would be paid back by homeowners' payments on their home loans. NO: The state would not be required to create a new homebuying assistance program.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  7. Proposition 38YES: The state could borrow $8.4 billion to support medical research in immunology and immunotherapy conducted by California research institutes and universities. NO: The state could not borrow $8.4 billion to support medical research in immunology and immunotherapy conducted by California research institutes and universities.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  8. Proposition 39YES: Voters would be required to present additional identifying information to elections officials each time they vote. NO: A voter's identity would continue to be established with the voter's signature.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  9. Proposition 40YES: The state would collect a one-time tax from billionaires equal to 5 percent of their wealth. NO: The state would not collect a one-time tax from billionaires equal to 5 percent of their wealth.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  10. Proposition 41YES: When special taxes are proposed by voter initiatives, the California State Auditor would review programs funded by the tax before the initiative appears on the ballot. The California State Auditor also would regularly review programs funded by special taxes approved by voters or the Legislature. In addition, the state might not be able to exclude any new special tax spending from its spending limit. NO: The California State Auditor's responsibility to review government programs would not change. The state spending limit requirements would not change.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  11. Proposition 42YES: The state could not establish new taxes on the ownership of financial assets or other personal property. NO: The state would continue to have the option to establish new taxes on the ownership of financial assets or other personal property.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  12. Proposition 43YES: Certain local government taxes would require two-thirds approval by voters. NO: Certain local government taxes could continue to be approved by voters with a majority vote.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  13. Proposition 44YES: Certain private nonprofit health care clinics would have to spend at least 90 percent of their revenue each year on providing health care services. NO: The new requirement on health care clinic spending would not go into effect.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  14. Proposition 45YES: Certain public and private projects would be eligible for new project review and court challenge procedures. For example, new procedures would tighten time limits for environmental review and reduce the scope of what courts can consider when reviewing legal challenges. NO: Public and private projects would continue to use existing project review and court challenge procedures.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  15. Proposition A (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to amend the Charter to align it with how some City departments currently operate, change some processes, eliminate or reorganize certain commissions and advisory bodies, and require the Board of Supervisors to amend voter-approved laws to enact some of these changes. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  16. Proposition B (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to authorize the City to establish a municipal finance corporation and a public bank. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to authorize the City to establish a municipal finance corporation and a public bank.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  17. Proposition C (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to amend the Charter to change how the City's annual contributions to the Housing Trust Fund are set, increase funding and expand programs for affordable housing, and extend the Fund to 2058. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  18. Proposition D (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to increase the requirements for signature initiatives from 2% to 8% of registered voters (currently from about 10,600 to about 42,500 signatures), increase the requirements for special elections, allow signature initiatives to be withdrawn, and remove the ability of a minority of Board members or the Mayor to place measures on the ballot. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  19. Proposition E (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to give the City Administrator more authority by centralizing the City's Purchasing rules and processes, changing how the City approves Purchasing rules, changing when contracts and leases require Board approval, and extending the City Administrator's term. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  20. Proposition F (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to expand the Mayor's authority to transfer responsibilities, hire deputy mayors, hire some and fire most department heads, and allow City officials to remove members of boards or commissions without cause. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  21. Proposition G (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to close Sunset Dunes Park from Monday at 4:00 a.m. through Friday at 6:00 p.m., unless a holiday falls on a weekday, in order to reopen the roadway known as the Upper Great Highway to private vehicles during that time. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want the City to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  22. Proposition H (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want the City to fund Muni service through a new annual parcel tax on real estate. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  23. Proposition I (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to dedicate half of the transfer tax revenues when certain real estate with a value or sales price of more than $10,000,000 changes hands, to be spent only on affordable housing, including social housing developments and housing assistance. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  24. Proposition J (San Francisco)YES: If you vote "yes," you want to apply a transfer tax for properties such as commercial, industrial, and large residential properties, that are transferred to a lender because of foreclosure. NO: If you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.Full information · Evidence on both sides
  25. Regional Measure RTM (San Francisco Bay Area)Regional Transit MeasureFull information · Evidence on both sides

California statewide measures

Proposition 1

Authorizes Bonds for Housing Affordability Programs. Legislative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by the Legislature Authorizes $11.25 billion in state general obligation bonds for housing affordability programs, including multifamily rental housing, mortgages for veterans, supportive housing, preservation of existing affordable housing, and downpayment assistance.

A YES vote meansThe state could borrow $11.25 billion to support veterans and affordable housing.
A NO vote meansThe state could not borrow $11.25 billion to support veterans and affordable housing.

Fiscal effect: Increased state cost of $500 million to $600 million annually for about 25 years to repay the housing bond.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Housing supply is relevant to affordability Peer-reviewed housing research links constrained supply with higher housing costs and finds that additional supply can reduce upward pressure in some markets. Bond funding would not solve regulatory or land-use barriers, but it could complement reforms by financing construction and preservation. [source]
  • Affordable-housing investment can improve housing stability Research and public-program evidence indicate that subsidized housing can improve housing stability and produce resident or neighborhood benefits when projects are well designed and managed. A bond could provide upfront capital for projects that otherwise would not be built or preserved. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Bond repayment creates a long-term budget obligation General-obligation bonds are repaid with state revenues, so approval commits future budgets to debt service. That cost must be weighed against other public priorities, particularly if the proposition’s housing outcomes are uncertain or implementation is slow. [source]
  • Targeted benefits may not lower costs for most households Affordable-housing programs generally target particular income groups and locations rather than lowering prices across the entire housing market. Even if funded projects benefit eligible residents, that does not establish that the measure would materially improve affordability for the broader electorate. [source] [source]

See all 4 sources

Proposition 2

Increases State’s Rainy Day Fund. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by the Legislature Increases California's Rainy Day Fund, approved by voters in 2014, to provide funding for education, health care, public safety, and other essential services during economic downturns.

A YES vote meansRules for building state budget reserves and paying down extra state debts would change. As a result, state budget reserves would be higher. The state also would be required to make extra debt payments for longer.
A NO vote meansRules for building state budget reserves and paying down extra state debts would not change.

Fiscal effect: State budget reserves would be higher.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure would institutionalize saving during boom years Proposition 2 would require deposits until the rainy-day account reaches 20% of General Fund taxes and would require additional deposits in unusually strong capital-gains years. This directly addresses the risk that politically difficult savings will be postponed during periods of high revenue. [source] [source]
  • Larger reserves could cushion future downturns California’s revenue base is unusually exposed to income and capital-gains fluctuations, and the Legislative Analyst says downturns can reduce revenue by tens of billions of dollars. A larger reserve could help preserve services and reduce abrupt spending cuts, tax increases, or borrowing during a recession. [source] [source]
  • Extended debt payments may reduce long-term costs The measure extends extra payments toward eligible pension, retiree-health, education, state-fund, and certain federal loans through 2040. Paying down obligations earlier can reduce future interest or liability exposure, although the official analysis says the amount of additional debt payment is uncertain. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • A 20% target is not established as optimal Evidence supports maintaining reserves, but the research does not establish that doubling California’s cap is the best target. Pew and the Legislative Analyst emphasize tailoring reserves to revenue volatility, spending obligations, withdrawal rules, and the duration of downturns rather than relying on a universal balance threshold. [source] [source]
  • Constitutional savings may crowd out current priorities Money deposited into reserves or directed toward debt payments cannot be used immediately for other state purposes. The California Budget & Policy Center argues that the measure could reduce legislative flexibility when California faces needs such as schools, housing, infrastructure, or health programs, even if total reserves rise. [source] [source]

See all 9 sources

Proposition 3

Provides Permanent Funding for Schools and Health Care by Extending Existing Tax on High Incomes. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Makes permanent existing voter-approved tax rates for individuals earning over $371,000 (adjusted annually for inflation). Allocates tax revenues to public education.

A YES vote meansAn income tax increase on high-income earners in place since 2012 would become permanent instead of expiring in 2031.
A NO vote meansAn income tax increase on high-income earners in place since 2012 would expire in 2031.

Fiscal effect: Maintains $5 billion to $15 billion of annual state income tax revenue by making a temporary tax increase on high-income earners permanent instead of letting it expire in 2031.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure preserves a major public-service revenue stream The official fiscal analysis estimates that Proposition 3 would preserve $5 billion to $15 billion annually rather than allowing the existing rates to expire. Because the revenue supports schools, community colleges, health care, reserves, and other programs, approval would reduce the need to replace that funding through spending cuts or other taxes. [1][2] [source] [source]
  • The tax burden is concentrated among very high earners The Legislative Analyst reports that the higher rates apply to roughly the top 2 percent of taxpayers, who pay about half of state income taxes. The measure therefore preserves funding through a narrowly targeted tax rather than a broad-based increase, while the official text keeps the existing rates unchanged. [2][3] [source] [source]
  • Evidence does not establish a large taxpayer exodus Although high earners respond to tax differences, broader migration research finds that state taxes generally have small effects on interstate moves compared with other factors. This weakens the claim that extending the rates would necessarily eliminate most of the projected revenue through migration. [10][11][13] [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • The revenue would be unusually volatile The Legislative Analyst estimates a very wide annual range, from $5 billion to $15 billion, because much of the revenue is tied to stock-market-related income. Official revenue estimates and recent budget reporting show that California’s personal-income-tax receipts can swing sharply, making permanent commitments harder to plan. [2][14][15] [source] [source]
  • More spending does not guarantee better results School-finance research supports average benefits from additional funding, but California-specific studies find that effects depend on targeting, implementation, and local use. Proposition 3 restricts administrative spending from specified funds, yet the official documents do not guarantee particular achievement gains or demonstrate that every district will spend the money effectively. [2][3][6][8] [source] [source]
  • High earners may reduce taxable income or relocate Peer-reviewed California research finds that high earners change reported income and other behavior in response to state tax differences. These responses could lower actual collections relative to static projections, though the evidence does not show that behavioral effects would erase the entire fiscal gain. [10][11][12] [source] [source]

See all 12 sources

Proposition 4

Repeals Prohibition Against Public Funding of Election Campaigns. Legislative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by the Legislature Repeals prohibition on state and local governments offering public funding of candidate election campaigns. Public funding programs may not use funds earmarked for education, transportation, or public safety.

A YES vote meansState and local governments could create public campaign financing programs for public office candidates, subject to limits on which public funds could be used, how the public funds could be used, and who could receive them.
A NO vote meansState and most local governments would remain unable to create public campaign finance programs for public office candidates.

Fiscal effect: Ongoing costs to the state of a few hundred thousand dollars each year for the Fair Political Practices Commission to answer questions from state and local governments about public campaign finance programs.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Repeal would enable small-donor financing reforms Public financing can make small contributions more valuable through matching funds or vouchers, reducing candidates’ reliance on wealthy donors. Evidence from Seattle and New York City indicates that carefully designed programs can increase small-donor participation and broaden the contributor base. Proposition 4 would remove a constitutional obstacle to adopting such systems in California. [source] [source]
  • A constitutional repeal preserves policy flexibility Proposition 4 does not mandate a particular public-financing model or appropriation. It would allow the Legislature and local governments to choose whether to create grants, matching funds, vouchers, or other systems and to revise them as evidence develops. This flexibility is useful because program outcomes vary substantially by design. [source] [source]
  • Public financing may lower barriers to candidacy Campaigns financed primarily through large private donations can disadvantage candidates who lack established donor networks. Research and program evaluations suggest that subsidies can encourage candidate entry and help candidates reach more small donors. The effect would depend on later legislation, but repeal would make those reforms legally available. [source]

Arguments against

  • Repeal alone would not change campaign financing The measure would remove a prohibition but would not establish a program, fund candidates, or reduce private-money influence. Any practical benefit would require subsequent legislation, appropriations, administration, and enforcement. Voters therefore cannot treat repeal itself as evidence that campaign financing will improve. [source] [source]
  • Public financing may not reduce outside spending Public subsidies do not necessarily constrain independent expenditures by corporations, unions, wealthy individuals, or outside groups. Constitutional protections limit how broadly government can regulate such spending, so publicly financed candidates could still face high-spending opponents or outside advertising. [source]

See all 6 sources

Proposition 5

Changes Recall Election Process for Statewide Officers. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by the Legislature Under current law, voters elect replacement candidates at the same time as the recall election. This measure instead fills recall vacancies by subsequent special election or appointment.

A YES vote meansRecall elections would no longer include a question about who should fill the vacancy. Instead, vacancies typically would be filled through special elections or appointments, depending on the office and timing.
A NO vote meansVoters would continue to be asked who should fill the vacancy as part of recall elections.

Fiscal effect: Net fiscal effect unknown. In the event of a recall, savings or costs of millions of dollars to administer the election depending on the office recalled.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Existing vacancy rules may provide more continuity The measure generally applies procedures already used when state offices become vacant for reasons such as resignation or death. For the governorship, the Lieutenant Governor would assume office, with a special-election pathway in a limited early-term circumstance. This could reduce uncertainty and avoid selecting a successor through a crowded, low-information contest. [source] [source]
  • The current successor vote can produce a weak mandate California’s replacement contest uses plurality voting among potentially many candidates. Evidence from the 2021 recall indicates that the leading replacement candidate received fewer votes than the number of voters opposing removal, supporting the concern that removal and succession can yield conflicting mandates. Proposition 5 would separate those decisions and use a later election or established vacancy rule for… [source] [source]
  • Removing successor candidates could reduce some election costs The Legislative Analyst identifies potential savings from eliminating candidate information and voting materials for the replacement question, particularly when an appointment or gubernatorial succession would otherwise follow. The savings could reach millions in an individual recall, although their occurrence depends on the office and number of candidates. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Separate special elections could increase costs A recalled legislative official would typically require a separate special election, and that election might not be consolidated with a regularly scheduled election. The Legislative Analyst estimates that such an election could cost millions, offsetting or exceeding savings from a shorter recall ballot. The overall fiscal effect is explicitly unknown. [source] [source]
  • Appointments could shift power away from the electorate For several statewide offices, existing vacancy law relies on gubernatorial appointment rather than an immediate statewide vote. Proposition 5 would invoke those rules after a recall, creating circumstances in which the official who survives politically could be replaced by an executive appointee. That may improve continuity but weakens the claim that a recall directly determines the electorate’s preferred successor. [source] [source]
  • The measure removes voters’ immediate choice of successor After a successful recall, voters would no longer select a replacement in the same election. Depending on the office, the successor could instead be appointed by the Governor, supplied by succession rules, or chosen in a later special election. Opponents therefore argue that Proposition 5 reduces direct voter control over who holds the office. [source] [source]

See all 7 sources

Proposition 37

Creates Loan Program for Middle-Income Buyers of Qualified New Homes. Initiative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Authorizes $25 billion in bonds to offer eligible buyers fixed-rate mortgages for up to 17% of purchase price of a newly constructed home priced below about $1.5 million. Borrowers must be California residents, occupy the home, meet income limits, and pay at least 3% down. Bonds repaid by mortgage payments, not State.

A YES vote meansThe state would create a new homebuying assistance program. The state could sell up to $25 billion in revenue bonds to fund the program. Bonds would be paid back by homeowners' payments on their home loans.
A NO vote meansThe state would not be required to create a new homebuying assistance program.

Fiscal effect: No direct state or local costs.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Restricting assistance to new homes may support construction Because the program is described as applying to qualified new homes, it may direct demand toward additional housing rather than only bidding up existing homes. Research finds that housing supply constraints are a major source of high prices, and policies connected to new construction can have broader benefits if they induce genuinely additional units. That outcome is not guaranteed without details on qualification… [source] [source]
  • The measure could reduce upfront barriers to ownership A state loan program could help otherwise creditworthy middle-income households overcome down-payment or financing constraints. Evidence on housing assistance suggests that reducing upfront barriers can increase access to homeownership for some eligible households, while existing CalHFA programs provide administrative precedent. The measure's actual reach would depend on loan terms, eligibility rules, funding, and… [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Buyer assistance can be capitalized into higher prices Demand subsidies often increase prices when supply is limited, allowing sellers or builders to capture part of the assistance. California's affordability constraints make this risk relevant, especially if the program expands purchasing power without producing enough additional homes. The new-home restriction may reduce this problem only if participating construction is additional and sufficiently large. [source] [source]
  • The program could expose households and taxpayers to financial risk Loans can improve access while leaving recipients with repayment obligations and exposure to falling home values, income shocks, or foreclosure. Federal Reserve evidence identifies both wealth benefits and risks of homeownership, and borrower-support research suggests safeguards matter. Without publicly available details on underwriting, loss sharing, funding, and foreclosure protections, the fiscal and household… [source] [source]

See all 8 sources

Proposition 38

Authorizes Bonds for Immunology Medical Research. Initiative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Authorizes $8.4 billion in general obligation bonds for immunology and immunotherapy research, half to a single University of California-affiliated nonprofit medical research institute, half to research grants.

A YES vote meansThe state could borrow $8.4 billion to support medical research in immunology and immunotherapy conducted by California research institutes and universities.
A NO vote meansThe state could not borrow $8.4 billion to support medical research in immunology and immunotherapy conducted by California research institutes and universities.

Fiscal effect: Increased state cost of $500 million to $600 million annually for about 20 years to repay the research bond, with some or all of the cost offset if the funded research generates revenue.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Immunotherapy has demonstrated clinical value Systematic evidence shows that immune-based treatments can benefit some patients, particularly in cancer, and the field has produced approved therapies. Additional funding could expand work on response, resistance, combination treatments, and other diseases, though results will vary by condition. [source] [source]
  • The measure directs funds toward California institutions and patient benefits Proposition 38 would fund California public and nonprofit research organizations, impose reporting and audit requirements, and require qualifying treatments sold in California to be offered at a discount. These provisions could retain research activity in the state and provide a direct benefit if treatments reach patients. [source] [source]
  • Long-term discoveries could offset some public costs The measure requires 10 percent of revenue from funded discoveries to go first toward repaying the state. Public research can generate licensing and economic benefits, so successful commercialization could reduce the net cost, although the timing and amount are uncertain. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Clinical and financial returns are highly uncertain Most research projects do not progress through discovery, clinical testing, regulatory review, and successful commercialization. Preclinical limitations and variable immunotherapy outcomes make it impossible to infer that the bond will repay itself or produce major health-care savings. [source] [source]
  • The bond creates a substantial guaranteed budget obligation The state would owe approximately $500 million to $600 million annually for about 20 years, regardless of whether the research succeeds. Interest makes the total cost higher than an equivalent upfront appropriation, and debt service could compete with other General Fund priorities. [source] [source]
  • The allocation may concentrate decision-making and reduce competition About half of the money would go to one qualifying UC-affiliated nonprofit institute, while the grant council would select applicants from member institutions. Reporting and audits improve transparency, but they do not eliminate concerns that eligibility rules could favor established institutions or narrow the research portfolio. [source] [source]

See all 15 sources

Proposition 39

Prohibits Citizens from Voting Unless They Present Government-Issued Identification. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Invalidates mail ballots that do not have last four digits of designated government-issued identification number written on envelope. Prohibits in-person voting without presenting government-issued identification.

A YES vote meansVoters would be required to present additional identifying information to elections officials each time they vote.
A NO vote meansA voter's identity would continue to be established with the voter's signature.

Fiscal effect: Costs of between tens of millions of dollars and low hundreds of millions of dollars each year to implement new voting requirements.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure would create a uniform identity check Proposition 39 would replace California’s current in-person signature-based identification process with a government-issued identification check and would require a matching identifier for vote-by-mail ballots. Supporters can reasonably argue that uniform documentary verification would create a clearer eligibility-control standard, even though evidence that it would prevent common forms of election fraud is… [source] [source]
  • Citizenship-verification reporting could improve oversight Proposition 39 would require election officials to use best efforts to verify citizenship attestations with government data and publish county-level verification percentages. Public reporting and State Auditor audits could expose inconsistencies and encourage more systematic maintenance of voter records. However, the measure does not specify the data sources, error safeguards, or operational definition of best… [source] [source]
  • Identification rules may reassure skeptical voters The measure expressly aims to increase public confidence, and research indicates that voter-identification rules can affect perceptions of election legitimacy, particularly among voters already concerned about fraud. That perceptual benefit would not prove greater election accuracy, but proponents may value increased confidence as a civic outcome. The evidence is mixed and partly partisan, so the likely benefit is… [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • The measure could reject eligible mail ballots for matching errors Most California voters use vote-by-mail ballots, and Proposition 39 would require the envelope to contain the last four digits of the exact government-issued number designated in the voter’s registration. A voter who uses a different qualifying document, records the wrong digits, or has an incorrect registration record could have the ballot rejected unless an effective cure process is created. Existing California… [source] [source]
  • Identification burdens may fall unevenly across voters Research finds that strict identification requirements can impose larger burdens on people with limited documentation, unstable housing, disability-related barriers, transportation constraints, or less access to government offices. A free voter ID card removes the card fee but does not necessarily eliminate the need to obtain underlying documents, travel, correct records, or learn a new process. California-specific… [source] [source]
  • The evidence for preventing impersonation is weak The principal fraud target described in the measure is voter impersonation, but empirical research indicates that documented in-person impersonation is rare. California already verifies vote-by-mail signatures and uses registration checks, so the incremental security effect of requiring identification is uncertain. Identification could therefore impose substantial administrative and access costs without preventing… [source] [source]

See all 17 sources

Proposition 40

Imposes One-Time Tax on Certain Taxpayers. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Imposes 5% tax on certain taxpayers with assets over $1 billion; revenue primarily for health care. Exempts revenues from constitutional requirements for school funding and spending limit.

A YES vote meansThe state would collect a one-time tax from billionaires equal to 5 percent of their wealth.
A NO vote meansThe state would not collect a one-time tax from billionaires equal to 5 percent of their wealth.

Fiscal effect: Temporary revenue increase of tens of billions of dollars spread over several years from wealth tax on billionaires. Possible ongoing decrease of less than $1 billion per year in income tax revenue from billionaires.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure could provide substantial temporary funding The official fiscal analysis says Proposition 40 would probably raise tens of billions of dollars over several years. Because the measure directs most proceeds to health care and bars using them to replace existing funding, approval could provide resources during a period of funding pressure. [source] [source]
  • Health-care spending can improve access and outcomes Research on Medicaid coverage and expansion generally finds improved access and associations with better health outcomes. Proposition 40 would dedicate 90% of its receipts to public health-care services, so the measure has a plausible mechanism for producing broad benefits, although the eventual effectiveness would depend on implementation. [source] [source]
  • The one-time structure may limit permanent exposure Unlike an annual wealth tax, Proposition 40 is designed as a one-time levy, with payment spread over several years at the taxpayer’s option. This could reduce continuing incentives for relocation or long-term portfolio restructuring compared with a recurring tax, although the initial liability may still affect behavior. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • The measure could face legal challenges Legal scholarship identifies unresolved questions about whether wealth taxes are direct taxes and how constitutional restrictions apply. Although Proposition 40 includes state constitutional language, litigation could delay collections, increase costs, or alter the measure’s operation. [source] [source]
  • Revenue estimates are unusually uncertain The amount collected depends on volatile asset prices, valuation of private businesses and other assets, compliance, avoidance, and the timing of payments. The official analysis explicitly says the amount and timing are very hard to predict, while U.S. tax-policy research identifies the same design problems as central limitations of wealth-tax forecasts. [source] [source]
  • Administration could be complex and costly Valuing private companies, intellectual property, art, collectibles, and other covered assets would require specialized assessments and enforcement. The official analysis projects administrative costs of tens of millions of dollars annually for several years, and international evidence shows that offshore ownership can complicate collection. [source] [source]

See all 11 sources

Proposition 41

Prohibits New State Taxes That Exclude Revenues from State Spending Limit. Requires Audits for New State Special Taxes. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Nullifies state taxes enacted after January 1, 2026 that exempt their revenues from voter-approved state spending limit. Requires pre-election and recurring audits of programs funded by new special taxes.

A YES vote meansWhen special taxes are proposed by voter initiatives, the California State Auditor would review programs funded by the tax before the initiative appears on the ballot. The California State Auditor also would regularly review programs funded by special taxes approved by voters or the Legislature. In addition, the state might not be able to exclude any new special tax spending from its spending limit.
A NO vote meansThe California State Auditor's responsibility to review government programs would not change. The state spending limit requirements would not change.

Fiscal effect: The net fiscal effect is unknown as it depends on future decisions by voters, the Legislature, and other policymakers.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure could limit budget workarounds Restricting new taxes that exclude revenue from the state spending limit could reduce opportunities to move revenues outside the ordinary constitutional spending-limit framework. The LAO’s explanation of Proposition 41 and the existing Article XIII B framework are the strongest evidence for this accountability rationale. Whether the restriction materially changes future budgets depends on how broadly the amendment… [source] [source]
  • Audits could increase transparency for dedicated taxes Requiring audits of new state special taxes could give voters and policymakers more information about whether dedicated revenues are collected and spent as promised. Existing Controller and State Auditor materials show that California has audit institutions, but Proposition 41 could require scrutiny at the creation of new special taxes rather than relying only on discretionary or later reviews. The strength of this… [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Audits may duplicate existing oversight California already has financial reporting and audit institutions operated by the State Controller and State Auditor. If Proposition 41 requires audits without providing additional authority, resources, or consequences, it could add administrative costs without producing proportionate accountability gains. The available government materials establish existing oversight, but the proposition-specific analysis is… [source] [source]
  • The spending-limit rule could reduce fiscal flexibility California’s spending-limit system is already technically complex and interacts with revenue classifications and changing economic conditions. Adding constitutional restrictions on new tax structures could make it harder for lawmakers to design dedicated funding mechanisms or respond to emerging needs without seeking another constitutional amendment. Prior LAO analyses support the complexity concern, while the… [source] [source]

See all 8 sources

Proposition 42

Prohibits New State Personal Property Taxes and Certain Retroactive State Taxes. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Prohibits any new state tax (1) imposed on the ownership of personal property (all things people own other than real estate), or (2) that applies retroactively based on taxpayer's past activities. Nullifies taxes enacted after January 1, 2026 that conflict with this measure.

A YES vote meansThe state could not establish new taxes on the ownership of financial assets or other personal property.
A NO vote meansThe state would continue to have the option to establish new taxes on the ownership of financial assets or other personal property.

Fiscal effect: Possibility that tax revenues will not go up as much in the future.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure would protect taxpayers from new state taxes Proposition 42 would place the prohibition in the Constitution, making it harder for future legislatures to impose a new state tax on personal property. Its restriction on certain retroactive taxes could also improve predictability for taxpayers and businesses. The official text and voter guide establish these protections, while broader tax-policy research identifies investment and compliance benefits from limiting… [source] [source]
  • Constitutional protection may increase legal certainty A clear constitutional rule against specified retroactive state taxes could reduce uncertainty about whether past transactions may later be taxed. Legal analysis recognizes that retroactive taxation can create due-process concerns, even though existing constitutional doctrine sometimes permits limited retroactivity. Proposition 42 would provide a broader state-law constraint than case-by-case litigation alone. [source] [source]
  • Tax limits may improve investment incentives Business personal-property taxes can raise the cost of equipment and other mobile capital, potentially discouraging investment or encouraging firms to locate elsewhere. Limiting the state’s ability to create such taxes could reduce those incentives and simplify planning. This is a general economic inference rather than a California-specific forecast, so its magnitude is uncertain. [source]

Arguments against

  • The measure could reduce future fiscal flexibility Constitutional tax restrictions can limit a legislature’s ability to respond to recessions, emergencies, or changing revenue needs. The LAO’s analysis of California’s volatile tax system and research on tax limitations indicate that narrower tax authority may force spending cuts, borrowing, or taxes on other bases. The actual effect depends on whether California would otherwise enact the prohibited taxes. [source] [source]
  • The measure may shift taxes rather than reduce government costs If future policymakers cannot use the prohibited tax bases, they may seek revenue from income, sales, real-property, or other taxes instead. Comparative property-tax evidence shows that removing a tax base can require replacement revenue or reduce public services. Proposition 42 therefore may change who pays rather than produce an equivalent reduction in government obligations. [source]

See all 8 sources

Proposition 43

Limits Voters’ Ability to Raise Revenues for Local Government Services. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.

Put on the Ballot by the Legislature Limits voters' ability to pass voter-proposed local special taxes by increasing percentage of votes needed to approve such ballot measures from a majority (over 50%) to two-thirds, beginning January 1, 2027.

A YES vote meansCertain local government taxes would require two-thirds approval by voters.
A NO vote meansCertain local government taxes could continue to be approved by voters with a majority vote.

Fiscal effect: Possibility that local government tax revenues will not go up as much in the future due to a higher vote threshold for certain taxes.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • A revenue limit could constrain local tax burdens If Proposition 43 reduces the range or ease of local revenue measures, residents could face fewer locally imposed taxes or charges. The available background literature on California revenue limits is relevant to that possibility, but no retrieved source quantifies the effect of this proposal specifically. [source] [source]
  • The amendment could increase voter control over local taxation Supporters could argue that limiting revenue authority preserves taxpayer control and prevents local officials from expanding revenues without sufficiently broad consent. This argument depends on the proposal’s actual voting thresholds and scope, which were not available in the retrieved evidence. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Limits could reduce funding for local services Restricting voters’ ability to raise local revenues may make it harder for communities to fund schools, transportation, public safety, housing, and other services when state or federal funding is insufficient. PPIC’s research on local revenue measures is relevant background, but it does not establish Proposition 43’s likely magnitude of impact. [source] [source]
  • A statewide rule may fit local conditions poorly California communities differ in service needs, tax bases, and preferences. A constitutional restriction applying statewide could reduce local flexibility, although the retrieved sources do not reveal whether Proposition 43 contains exemptions or differentiated rules. [source] [source]

See all 4 sources

Proposition 44

Requires Community Health Clinics Spend 90% Of Revenue on Program Services. Initiative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Imposes penalties on nonprofit Federally Qualified Health Centers (community clinics providing primary care to medically underserved areas and populations) that spend less than 90% of revenue on "program services" advancing their charitable purpose, including but not limited to patient services.

A YES vote meansCertain private nonprofit health care clinics would have to spend at least 90 percent of their revenue each year on providing health care services.
A NO vote meansThe new requirement on health care clinic spending would not go into effect.

Fiscal effect: Increased state costs in the low tens of millions of dollars per year, covered by fees.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure could direct more money toward patient services A statutory minimum could limit excessive administrative or nonprogram spending and make clinics more visibly accountable for using revenue to provide care. The official text and fiscal analysis are the decisive sources for whether the 90% threshold is workable and enforceable, while nonprofit reporting rules show that clinics already operate under accountability requirements. [source] [source]
  • A clear ratio may improve transparency for donors and taxpayers A uniform spending benchmark would give the public an easily understood measure of how much clinic revenue reaches defined services. Research on overhead perceptions indicates that donors often use spending ratios when judging nonprofits, although a ratio may not accurately capture quality or long-term effectiveness. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • The rule may not improve health outcomes Evidence on federally qualified health centers suggests that payment models and care-delivery incentives affect performance, while Proposition 44 focuses on an accounting ratio. The available peer-reviewed study does not show that a 90% spending mandate improves access, quality, or patient outcomes. [source]
  • A rigid cap could treat necessary infrastructure as waste Clinics need administration, compliance, information technology, staffing systems, fundraising, and evaluation to deliver care and remain eligible for public programs. Nonprofit-sector guidance and IRS requirements support the concern that reducing or reclassifying these functions could weaken operations rather than increase services. [source] [source]

See all 7 sources

Proposition 45

Modifies Environmental Review for Certain Projects. Initiative Statute.

Put on the Ballot by Petition Signatures Amends California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to expedite environmental review for certain projects (including most housing, transportation, water, and health projects) by setting deadlines to complete environmental review and resolve lawsuits challenging project approvals.

A YES vote meansCertain public and private projects would be eligible for new project review and court challenge procedures. For example, new procedures would tighten time limits for environmental review and reduce the scope of what courts can consider when reviewing legal challenges.
A NO vote meansPublic and private projects would continue to use existing project review and court challenge procedures.

Fiscal effect: Initial costs for state and local governments, likely in the high tens of millions of dollars-potentially exceeding $100 million-annually, partly covered by fees. Uncertain, potentially more significant positive or negative longer-term fiscal effects.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Binding deadlines could reduce administrative delay Proposition 45 would impose deadlines for application completeness, environmental impact reports, permits, and court challenges. Evidence that local review and commission processes affect housing completion time supports the mechanism by which faster procedures could reduce delays, although the measure's actual effect remains untested. [source] [source]
  • The measure preserves formal agency approval authority The text expressly states that public agencies retain authority to approve or disapprove essential projects and that projects remain subject to environmental review. This means the measure does not automatically authorize covered projects, even though it changes the procedures and legal remedies surrounding review. [source]
  • Faster approvals could lower some project costs The measure covers housing and public infrastructure categories for which delay can increase financing, administrative, and construction costs. California's high housing costs have multiple causes, including regulatory constraints, so Proposition 45 could address one contributor, but available evidence does not quantify the resulting savings. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Reduced alternatives may weaken environmental mitigation Under the measure, an applicant may develop only one project alternative for agency consideration, while current CEQA practice requires agencies to consider multiple feasible alternatives that could reduce environmental impacts. Limiting alternatives could reduce opportunities to redesign projects before approval. [source] [source]
  • Restricted court remedies could make violations harder to correct Proposition 45 would limit what courts may consider and prevent them from stopping an entire project when part of the CEQA review is deficient. Critics argue this could allow construction to proceed while environmental problems are corrected, reducing the practical deterrent of CEQA litigation. [source] [source]
  • Shorter participation and narrower consultation could exclude communities The measure limits public-comment periods and narrows required consultation to federally recognized California tribes. State guidance identifies meaningful participation and attention to disproportionate burdens as components of environmental justice, so these procedural limits could reduce input from affected communities. [source] [source]

See all 10 sources

San Francisco local measures

Proposition A

Charter Changes Affecting Various City Departments and Commissions

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to amend the Charter to align it with how some City departments currently operate, change some processes, eliminate or reorganize certain commissions and advisory bodies, and require the Board of Supervisors to amend voter-approved laws to enact some of these changes.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Updating obsolete Charter rules could improve administrative clarity The official digest says parts of the Charter and voter-approved laws have become obsolete and that the measure would align legal language with how departments currently operate. Removing obsolete requirements and placing some operational provisions in the Municipal Code could make future administrative changes easier, though the measure’s breadth makes the net effect uncertain. [source]
  • Consolidation may reduce duplication and staff burden The Controller identifies staff time devoted to supporting commissions as a source of savings, and reform analyses describe overlapping or unclear responsibilities among city bodies. If consolidation preserves the necessary functions, fewer bodies could reduce meeting, reporting, and coordination costs. [source] [source]
  • It addresses documented structural problems The Civil Grand Jury and the city’s Commission Streamlining Task Force both identified the commission system as requiring review and possible restructuring. Proposition A implements some of the kind of consolidation, clarification, and modernization those processes considered, giving the measure a city-specific administrative rationale rather than relying only on general reform claims. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Participation benefits depend on representation and design Research generally finds that advisory and participatory bodies can improve legitimacy, local knowledge, and accountability, but only when they are inclusive and influential. Proposition A’s consolidation could improve poorly functioning bodies, yet the available evidence does not show that the replacement structures will preserve these benefits for affected communities. [source] [source]
  • Eliminating bodies can reduce independent oversight The measure would eliminate or reorganize several commissions and remove general Charter requirements for annual statements of purpose, executive secretaries, and annual reports. Because advisory and oversight bodies can provide information, legitimacy, and accountability, reducing them could weaken checks on departments even if the fiscal savings are realized. [source] [source]
  • The measure combines many unrelated governance changes Proposition A changes commissions, departmental reporting, labor-related provisions, utility authority, real-estate powers, legal-settlement approvals, and parental-leave rules in one Charter amendment. This breadth makes it difficult for voters to weigh each change separately and increases the risk that desirable technical edits are bundled with controversial shifts in authority. [source] [source]

See all 12 sources

Proposition B

Establishing a Municipal Finance Corporation and a Public Bank

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to authorize the City to establish a municipal finance corporation and a public bank.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to authorize the City to establish a municipal finance corporation and a public bank.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • A public lender could target underserved priorities The proposed mission focuses on affordable housing, small businesses, climate infrastructure, and environmental justice. Research on public banks during financial crises suggests that public institutions can maintain or expand lending when private banks pull back, although the evidence is not specific to San Francisco. [source] [source]
  • Partnership lending could complement existing institutions California law allows public banks to engage in wholesale, participation, infrastructure, and local-agency lending, rather than requiring them to replace private banks. The Bank of North Dakota literature identifies partnerships with local financial institutions as one feature associated with its model. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Regulatory and operational requirements could delay or limit benefits A future public bank would need state and federal regulatory approval and would operate under capital, governance, and compliance requirements. Those safeguards reduce some risks but may make the transition slower, more expensive, and less flexible than the measure's broad mission suggests. [source] [source]
  • The eventual program could require substantial public funding The Controller estimates that establishing and operating the institutions could cost approximately $310 million to $460 million over eight years, with uncertain additional variation. Earlier working-group estimates also include capitalization and funding that may be financed through City grants or forgivable loans unlikely to be repaid. [source] [source]
  • Approval does not establish that the bank will be viable The proposed institution has no operating history in San Francisco, and the local viability projections depend on assumptions about capitalization, interest rates, loan losses, staffing, and demand. Evidence from North Dakota and international public banks may not transfer to a new municipal institution with a different scale and regulatory setting. [source] [source]

See all 10 sources

Proposition C

Contributions to the Housing Fund

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to amend the Charter to change how the City's annual contributions to the Housing Trust Fund are set, increase funding and expand programs for affordable housing, and extend the Fund to 2058.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Dedicated funding can expand affordable-housing capacity Proposition C would raise the annual Housing Trust Fund contribution toward $125 million and extend the program for fifteen additional years. San Francisco’s own housing strategy documents identify financing and preservation needs, while the Housing Trust Fund report shows that the City already has delivery programs for these funds. The measure therefore provides a larger and more predictable source for activities… [source]
  • Housing assistance can improve stability and well-being The measure would fund affordable rental and ownership housing, downpayment loans, and housing stabilization. Peer-reviewed evidence links housing stability with better health outcomes, and experimental voucher research finds that rental assistance can reduce housing instability. Those findings do not measure Proposition C directly, but they support the value of the services it would finance. [source]

Arguments against

  • The measure reduces budget flexibility The Controller projects additional General Fund costs rising from approximately $6 million to approximately $60 million annually by fiscal year 2034-35. Because the requirement is voter-adopted, those funds would be less available for other priorities during annual budget decisions. The Controller also notes that existing voter-required spending already represents about 30% of General Fund sources. [source]
  • Funding alone may not deliver broad affordability San Francisco planning research identifies land, construction costs, infrastructure, permitting, and development feasibility as interacting constraints. Research on land-use policy also indicates that supply conditions affect affordability, meaning subsidy increases alone may have limited effects on citywide rents. Proposition C does not itself guarantee production targets, cost controls, or regulatory changes. [source] [source]

See all 9 sources

Proposition D

Changes to Ballot Measure Process

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to increase the requirements for signature initiatives from 2% to 8% of registered voters (currently from about 10,600 to about 42,500 signatures), increase the requirements for special elections, allow signature initiatives to be withdrawn, and remove the ability of a minority of Board members or the Mayor to place measures on the ballot.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Higher thresholds could reduce ballot clutter The official measure text identifies a comparatively low signature threshold and points to a crowded San Francisco ballot. Research on ballot complexity and roll-off indicates that difficult or lengthy ballots can make it harder for voters to evaluate every measure. Raising qualification requirements could therefore improve the usability of the ballot, although the evidence does not directly predict the size of the… [source] [source]
  • The measure could encourage broader coalition support Requiring substantially more signatures may screen out proposals with narrow initial support and encourage proponents to build larger coalitions before qualification. The measure would still preserve citizen initiatives, while requiring majority Board approval for ordinances placed on the ballot. However, the research also indicates that coalition-building may be easier for organizations with greater resources. [source]

Arguments against

  • Higher thresholds could restrict citizen lawmaking Moving from 2% to 8% of registered voters substantially increases the organizational burden of qualifying an initiative. Research on signature campaigns and petition geography indicates that qualification depends on mobilization capacity and resources, so the change could exclude proposals supported by smaller or less well-funded groups even when they have meaningful public backing. [source] [source]
  • The change could increase the influence of organized money Petition drives and ballot campaigns require staffing, advertising, and distribution networks. Evidence that organized communication shapes initiative outcomes, combined with evidence that signature collection is resource-dependent, suggests that a higher threshold may shift influence toward established organizations and wealthy sponsors rather than reliably improving proposal quality. [source] [source]

See all 7 sources

Proposition E

City Administrator’s Authority and Changes to City Contracting

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to give the City Administrator more authority by centralizing the City's Purchasing rules and processes, changing how the City approves Purchasing rules, changing when contracts and leases require Board approval, and extending the City Administrator's term.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Centralization could reduce duplicated purchasing work Proposition E would require citywide purchasing and technology rules, which could reduce incompatible systems, repeated procurements, and fragmented procedures. The OECD identifies aggregation and professionalization as possible sources of administrative efficiency, while the field experiment provides direct evidence that centralized procurement can lower government purchasing prices in some circumstances. [source] [source]
  • Longer administrative tenure could support implementation A ten-year term could provide continuity for multi-year technology, capital-project, and contracting reforms that may outlast a shorter appointment cycle. This is a logical institutional benefit rather than a demonstrated forecast for San Francisco, and it depends on effective performance monitoring and removal mechanisms. [source]

Arguments against

  • The measure would reduce elected oversight of contracts The measure would allow the City Administrator to procure and execute contracts without interference from the Mayor or Board and would raise the value thresholds for Board approval. That could reduce opportunities for elected officials and the public to scrutinize major agreements before execution, especially where administrative controls are imperfect. [source]
  • Large citywide contracts could disadvantage smaller suppliers Aggregating procurement can increase bargaining power but may make contracts too large or administratively demanding for small and local businesses. OECD and supplier-diversity evidence supports preserving contract segmentation and access safeguards, which Proposition E does not itself specify in detail. [source] [source]
  • Concentrated discretion could increase favoritism risks Centralization may improve consistency, but it also concentrates contracting authority in one executive office. OECD and GAO evidence indicates that weak competition, noncompetitive awards, and insufficient monitoring can create corruption or value-for-money risks when discretion expands. [source] [source]

See all 9 sources

Proposition F

Changes to Executive Branch Management

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to expand the Mayor's authority to transfer responsibilities, hire deputy mayors, hire some and fire most department heads, and allow City officials to remove members of boards or commissions without cause.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Clearer responsibility could improve executive accountability Proposition F would give the Mayor authority over more department heads, deputy mayors, and organizational reporting relationships. The measure’s text and City reform reports identify fragmented responsibility and the Mayor’s direct supervision of nearly 50 departments as barriers to clear accountability. If voters can more readily identify who controls executive performance, electoral accountability could improve. [source] [source]
  • Central coordination may reduce administrative fragmentation Research and institutional analyses indicate that executive coordination can help mayors manage fragmented local government, especially when paired with performance measurement and management systems. Proposition F would permit deputy mayors and allow the Mayor to combine or transfer many departmental responsibilities, subject to specified limits and possible Board rejection. These mechanisms could make… [source] [source]
  • Personnel authority could enable faster responses to poor performance The measure would allow the Mayor to hire some and remove most department heads without board or commission involvement. That could reduce delays when a department head is ineffective or involved in serious misconduct, a problem explicitly cited in the measure text. The likely benefit depends on the Mayor using the authority based on performance rather than political loyalty. [source]

Arguments against

  • More authority does not guarantee better city services The available research emphasizes that mayoral authority must be accompanied by administrative capacity, reliable performance data, and implementation discipline. San Francisco’s performance program illustrates the importance of measurement and follow-through, while the fiscal statement provides no projected service or productivity gains. Therefore, the measure’s formal powers do not by themselves establish… [source] [source]
  • At-will removal could weaken independent oversight Proposition F would allow appointing authorities to remove most commissioners without cause, while also increasing mayoral control over department heads. Critics argue that commissioners may become more responsive to the appointing official than to legal, professional, or public-interest standards. The measure exempts several bodies, but the broader effect could still reduce institutional independence. [source] [source]
  • Concentrated authority may reduce checks on executive misconduct The Government Accountability Office describes accountability as requiring both clear responsibility and effective oversight. Proposition F strengthens the first element but could weaken the second if department heads and commissioners fear removal for disagreeing with the Mayor or another appointing authority. Existing exemptions preserve some safeguards, so the extent of this risk is uncertain. [source] [source]

See all 10 sources

Proposition G

Allowing Private Vehicles on the Great Highway in Sunset Dunes Park

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to close Sunset Dunes Park from Monday at 4:00 a.m. through Friday at 6:00 p.m., unless a holiday falls on a weekday, in order to reopen the roadway known as the Upper Great Highway to private vehicles during that time.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want the City to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The schedule preserves high-demand recreational periods Proposition G would retain vehicle-free periods from Friday evening through Monday morning and on holidays. Recreation and Parks visitation data show substantial use of the corridor as open space, so the proposal preserves the periods most associated with weekend recreation rather than eliminating park access altogether. [source]
  • Weekday reopening could reduce traffic diversion The measure would restore a direct north-south route during weekdays, when transportation demand is generally higher than recreational demand. SFMTA and independent data analyses document changed traffic-management conditions after closure, while the SF Standard reports worsening conditions on some nearby routes. The evidence supports localized congestion relief, but it does not establish the size of any citywide… [source] [source]
  • A mixed-use schedule has prior operational precedent San Francisco previously operated the Upper Great Highway with weekday vehicle access and weekend or holiday closures. The SFMTA pilot materials and the official measure text indicate that the proposed schedule is based on an earlier operating model, making it more administratively familiar than an entirely new arrangement. [source]

Arguments against

  • Reopening would impose substantial public costs The Controller estimates approximately $9.8 million in one-time capital costs and $500,000 to $1.9 million annually. Costs include signals, roadway maintenance, sand removal, and dune reshaping, while potential savings from reduced park staffing do not eliminate the projected fiscal increase. The upper end of the estimate is especially uncertain because it depends on weather, service levels, and future departmental… [source]
  • Vehicle access could reduce the park’s weekday recreational value Reopening would close Sunset Dunes Park to the public during most weekdays, replacing an open recreational corridor with private-vehicle use. Although the proposal preserves weekends and holidays, the Recreation and Parks visitation evidence does not demonstrate that weekday demand is negligible or that the remaining access would provide equivalent benefits. [source] [source]

See all 9 sources

Proposition H

Parcel Tax to Fund Public Muni Operations

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want the City to fund Muni service through a new annual parcel tax on real estate.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Service preservation may protect transit-dependent riders Research finds that transit cuts can impose unequal burdens on people and neighborhoods that depend more heavily on public transportation. Because Proposition H is directed to operations, approval could reduce the likelihood of cuts that disproportionately affect those riders, provided SFMTA allocates service equitably. [source] [source]
  • Maintaining frequency may protect ridership Muni ridership remains below its pre-pandemic level but has recovered substantially, indicating continued demand. Research associates service frequency and reliability with ridership, so avoiding reductions could help prevent a downward service-ridership cycle. [source] [source]
  • The measure could prevent near-term service reductions SFMTA has documented financial pressures and has already implemented service cuts associated with budget constraints. A dedicated operating revenue source could help preserve routes and frequency, although the size of the effect depends on the measure’s revenue relative to the projected gap. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • A subsidy does not ensure efficient operations Research on transit subsidies finds that additional operating support does not automatically translate into efficient performance. The external performance audit and the agency’s fiscal materials therefore make accountability, cost control, and performance conditions important unresolved questions for Proposition H. [source] [source]
  • The economic case depends on uncertain forecasts Supporters cite broader economic harm from service cuts, while the proposed tax’s economic-impact report estimates consequences under alternative scenarios. These projections are relevant but depend on assumptions about ridership, employment, property values, and service reductions, so they do not conclusively establish that approval produces net economic benefits. [source] [source]
  • The tax could impose costs without resolving structural gaps The measure would create a recurring dedicated revenue stream, but the projected shortfall and post-pandemic revenue changes suggest that Muni’s fiscal problem may be structural. If operating costs continue to rise faster than revenues, Proposition H could postpone future deficits rather than establish long-term sustainability. [source] [source]

See all 15 sources

Proposition I

Changes to Real Property Transfer Tax

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to dedicate half of the transfer tax revenues when certain real estate with a value or sales price of more than $10,000,000 changes hands, to be spent only on affordable housing, including social housing developments and housing assistance.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: see the official election office.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • Dedicated revenue could protect housing investment Proposition I would create a recurring restricted fund of approximately $119 million annually for affordable-housing production, preservation, tenant stabilization, and homelessness prevention. The official allocation rules would make those programs less vulnerable to annual competition with unrelated General Fund priorities, and City reports document existing housing programs that could use such resources. The… [source] [source]
  • Housing stability services can reduce displacement The measure directs at least 10% of House SF revenue to tenant stabilization or homelessness prevention, including eviction defense and prevention. Existing City oversight reports document housing-stability services funded through dedicated local revenue, while systematic evidence associates housing disadvantage with worse mental-health outcomes. These findings support prevention spending as a plausible route to… [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • Transfer taxes may discourage transactions and development Evidence from Los Angeles indicates that high-value transfer taxes can reduce transaction activity and may affect multifamily development. If similar responses occurred in San Francisco, the tax base could be smaller than expected and some housing production could be delayed or made less financially viable. The comparison is informative but uncertain because Proposition I does not increase the current combined top… [source]
  • Dedicated funding does not remove production bottlenecks San Francisco planning and housing-finance reports identify land, permitting, construction costs, financing assembly, and implementation capacity as barriers to affordable-housing production. Proposition I supplies funding but does not itself resolve those constraints. Therefore, a large dedicated fund may produce fewer units or slower results than supporters expect. [source] [source]

See all 8 sources

Proposition J

Removal of Foreclosure Exemption for Real Property Transfer Tax

A YES vote meansIf you vote "yes," you want to apply a transfer tax for properties such as commercial, industrial, and large residential properties, that are transferred to a lender because of foreclosure.
A NO vote meansIf you vote "no," you do not want to make these changes.

Fiscal effect: Controller's Statement on "J" City Controller Greg Wagner has issued the following statement on the fiscal impact of Proposition J: Should the proposed initiative ordinance be approved by the voters, in my opinion, it would significantly increase the City's Real Property Transfer Tax revenues although the amount generated each year would be unpredictable and likely to change significantly year-to-year. The measure could bring an average of $100 million to $150 million annually over the first five years. The total revenue in any given year will be highly dependent on the number of foreclosures and real estate conditions. It is likely that revenue increases would be highest in the near term then decline significantly over time. Currently the City partially exempts transfers of real property to a lender by foreclosure or in lieu of foreclosure from its Real Property Transfer Tax, which imposes a tax ranging from 0.5% to 6% of properties' consideration or value when they are transferred. The proposed ordinance would retain the existing partial exemption for foreclosures of residential and mixed-use properties with fewer than five residential units. However, the proposed ordinance would remove the foreclosure exemption from other property types and subject those transfers to the tax on the fair market value of the properties at the same rates as non-foreclosed properties. The revenue generated by this measure will be highly dependent on the number of foreclosures and distressed properties in the City. The number of distressed properties has risen since the COVID-19 pandemic because of the decline in property values resulting from the pandemic. If real estate recovers quickly and the number of foreclosures decreases, the proposed ordinance would bring in less revenue. But if the real estate market does not recover quickly and the number of foreclosures remains high, the proposed ordinance will generate more revenue. For context, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2021-2022, before the City's real estate market declined due to the pandemic, the proposed ordinance would have generated $3.2 million. However, several years later in FY 2025-26, the proposed ordinance would have generated $232.5 million. Based on the City's experience in the early 1990s recession and the Great Recession in the late 2000s, the number of foreclosure-related transactions will likely fall over a four-to-six-year period back to non-crisis levels. Revenue from this proposed measure is likely to be significantly more unpredictable than the current Real Property Transfer Tax. It falls on a very narrow and highly cyclical portion of property transfers in the City. There may be years where the proposed measure generates next to no new tax revenue.

Quoted from the official voter guide.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • It would treat large distressed transfers more like other transfers The current exemption reduces the tax when lenders take property through foreclosure or accept a deed in lieu, while ordinary property transfers are taxed under the City’s transfer-tax schedule. Supporters argue that removing the exemption for large commercial, industrial, and residential properties closes an unequal tax treatment without eliminating relief for small residential and mixed-use properties. [1][3][5] [source]

Arguments against

  • The tax could alter foreclosure timing or disposition incentives Because the proposal applies when a lender receives property through foreclosure or in lieu of foreclosure, lenders may have incentives to delay, restructure, or choose different disposition paths. Research shows that foreclosure delays affect borrower default behavior and can have labor-market consequences, although no cited study directly estimates this ordinance’s effect. [3][11][12] [source] [source]
  • Transfer taxes can reduce market liquidity Peer-reviewed studies of land-transfer taxes find fewer transactions and reduced housing mobility after taxes are imposed. Those studies are not direct estimates of Proposition J, but they provide evidence that a higher tax on distressed-property transfers could affect timing, pricing, or the willingness of parties to transact. [8][9][14] [source] [source]

See all 8 sources

Regional Measure RTM

Regional Transit Measure

The official text is not quoted here yet; see the official election office.

The evidence on both sides

Arguments for

  • The measure addresses an immediate operating-funding gap Multiple sources document persistent post-pandemic financial pressure at Bay Area transit agencies, including reduced fare revenue and projected deficits. The measure would provide approximately $980 million annually for 14 years, directly targeting operations rather than relying only on temporary aid or fare revenue. Evidence supports the need for funding, although it does not prove that the full tax amount is… [source] [source]
  • Stable service can protect access and reduce driving The measure preserves funding for rail, bus, ferry, reduced fares, accessibility, and transit priority programs. California transportation analysis finds that better transit service can improve access for people unable to drive and can reduce driving-related congestion and pollution. The size of those benefits depends on whether funded service is frequent, reliable, and attractive enough to change travel behavior. [source] [source]

Arguments against

  • The sales tax would burden lower-income households more Sales taxes generally consume a larger share of lower-income households' resources than of higher-income households' resources. RTM's broad retail tax therefore shifts part of transit financing onto consumers, including people who may use transit infrequently or not at all. Reduced fares and affordability programs may offset some burden but do not eliminate the tax's regressive structure. [source]
  • Transit funding does not guarantee ridership or emissions gains Research indicates that the effects of transit subsidies on ridership and environmental outcomes vary by local conditions. Bay Area travel patterns have changed since the pandemic, particularly through remote work, so preserving service may not restore former fare revenue or shift enough automobile trips to meet the measure's congestion and pollution goals. The measure's likely benefits are therefore uncertain… [source] [source]
  • New revenue may postpone difficult agency reforms Opponents argue that agencies should first address management, administrative costs, and accountability. MTC's efficiency review shows that agencies have undertaken cost-saving measures, but it does not establish that all available reforms have been exhausted or that RTM's allocations maximize service per dollar. Because the measure supplies operating funds for multiple agencies, voters cannot assume that added… [source]

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