Water scarcity will cause more conflicts than oil ever did

What's this about?

People disagree about whether a lack of water will cause more fights than oil ever did. The answer depends on what we call a fight and which years we compare.

What supporters say

• Water stress can make old troubles worse, push people to move, and raise the risk of fights.
• Water supports drinking, health, farms, nature, and jobs, so shortages can spark many local disputes.
• Climate change will raise water stress in many places, which may bring more movement and unrest.

What critics say

• We need a clear way to count conflict before we can fairly compare water and oil.
• Most water disputes do not become violent wars, so many disputes may still cause less harm.
• Oil has a clearer link to large wars, civil wars, and state violence.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; strong proof matters more than a long list.

The bottom line

Water could cause more small, local crises in the future, especially where poverty and weak rules already cause trouble. But the claim that water will cause more wars than oil lacks strong proof, while oil has a clearer past link to major conflict.

The claim that water scarcity will cause more conflict than oil is plausible in a limited sense, but difficult to test. The answer depends on what counts as “conflict,” the period being compared and how much blame can be assigned to water or oil.

The case for

Water stress can act as a broad risk multiplier. Shortages can worsen existing political tensions, encourage migration and intensify competition between communities, especially where governments are weak or exclude parts of the population. Climate assessments link drought, water insecurity, food disruption and displacement with greater insecurity in vulnerable areas. Research also finds connections between climate variability and conflict in some settings. 1

Water has an unusually direct connection to daily life. It is needed for drinking, sanitation, farming, ecosystems and rural incomes. That means shortages may produce repeated local or communal disputes, even when they do not lead to interstate war. In that sense, water scarcity could generate a larger number of lower-level crises than oil.

Climate change strengthens the forward-looking case. It is increasing exposure to drought and water stress in many regions, and these pressures may make migration and insecurity more common. 2 But this remains a projection, not a demonstrated historical ranking. Climate impacts do not automatically produce violence: poverty, political exclusion, weak institutions and existing conflicts often determine whether shortages escalate.

The argument is therefore strongest when it says water-related instability could become more widespread, particularly through local disputes and livelihood pressures. It is much weaker as a prediction that water scarcity will produce more wars than oil has produced.

The case against

Oil has a better-documented and more direct connection to major conflicts, particularly civil wars and state violence. Research on the “resource curse” links features such as concentrated, easily controlled oil wealth to rent capture, separatism and weak governments. Quantitative studies have also associated oil with the outbreak or duration of civil wars. 4

Water research, by comparison, more often describes scarcity as a conditional contributor. Its effects depend heavily on property rights, political power, institutions and the ability to resolve disputes. Transboundary water relations also frequently lead to negotiation and cooperation rather than violence. Most water disputes are not wars, and recorded disagreements should not automatically be treated as armed conflict. 5

The comparison itself has a major weakness. “Conflict” might mean interstate war, civil war, communal violence, protest, displacement or diplomatic disagreement. Existing conflict databases do not consistently identify water scarcity as a cause, and they cannot easily compare water-related events with oil-related wars using the same standard. 6

This matters because counting every water dispute could make water appear more conflict-producing simply by including many nonviolent or low-intensity events. Counting only wars, however, would leave out much of the local instability that supporters of the claim emphasize. Water and oil can both encourage bargaining as well as violence, depending on institutions and political conditions.

The bottom line

The evidence does not establish that water scarcity will cause more conflicts than oil has caused. The claim is plausible only in a qualified form: water stress may contribute to more frequent localized or communal instability as climate change increases exposure.

The underlying mechanisms are supported with moderate confidence, but confidence in the overall comparison is only low to moderate. Historical evidence more clearly supports oil as a driver of civil wars, foreign intervention and major state-level crises. Water may eventually produce more numerous local disputes, but there is no common measure showing that these will be more severe or more consequential than oil-related conflicts.

The decisive uncertainty is not whether water stress can matter. It is whether, under future political and institutional conditions, water-related disputes will become both numerous and severe enough to exceed the conflict burden associated with oil. Governance, adaptation and the definition of conflict will determine the answer.