Should Oakland voters approve Measure FF? (November 3, 2026 ballot)

What's this about?

People disagree about whether Oakland voters should approve Measure FF on the November 3, 2026 ballot.

The measure would add a tax when some foreclosed buildings change owners.

What supporters say

• It would make similar building sales follow more nearly the same tax rules.
• The tax could bring Oakland about $10 million to $14 million each year before costs.
• Big business and school or hospital buildings taken through foreclosure may be a fair group to tax.
• Foreclosures can hurt nearby home values and add costs for local services.

What critics say

• Owners may pass the tax cost to others or pay less for buildings they buy.
• The money raised could change a lot because it depends on the building market.
• A tax on each sale could lead to fewer sales or make deals harder.
• Costs from foreclosures might use up some or all of the new tax money.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; strong proof matters more than a long list.

Measure FF would extend Oakland’s real-property transfer tax to certain foreclosure-related transfers. Voters must weigh a potentially useful source of flexible city revenue against uncertainty about how much it would raise and who would ultimately bear the cost.

The case for

The strongest argument is that Measure FF could create a meaningful, flexible revenue stream from a defined group of distressed-property transactions. The City Auditor estimates first-year gross revenue of $10.4 million to $13.8 million, minus implementation costs of about $592,900 to $651,100. That would leave roughly $9.8 million to $13.2 million before any later changes in market activity (see Figure 1). The money would go into general city funds, allowing Oakland to use it for changing priorities rather than tying it to one program. 1

Measure FF would also make the tax rules more consistent. It would remove the broad exemption for foreclosure-related transfers while preserving protections for some small residential transfers, community banks, and conversions for housing or health care. Supporters argue that a large commercial or institutional property should not automatically escape the tax simply because it changed hands through foreclosure. Evidence from comparable systems suggests that foreclosure exemptions can cover high-value apartment and office properties, not just distressed homeowners. 2

That makes the proposed tax base more defensible than one aimed broadly at ordinary home sales. The measure’s focus would likely fall mainly on commercial and institutional transactions, while transfers involving properties with four or fewer residential units would often remain protected.

Supporters also point to the wider costs of foreclosures. They can affect nearby property values and local government finances. If those effects are significant in Oakland, taxing certain distressed-property transfers could give the city more capacity to respond, although the measure itself would not require the money to be spent on foreclosure prevention, affordable housing or neighborhood stabilization. 3

The case against

The main objection is that the revenue forecast is uncertain. It is based on a sample of recent commercial foreclosures, while transfer-tax collections can change sharply with foreclosure volume, property values and the broader real-estate market. A downturn could leave Oakland with substantially less revenue than projected. 5

There are also plausible economic costs. Research on broader housing transfer taxes has found that such taxes can reduce transactions and mobility, create economic losses and become reflected in property prices. Those studies do not examine Oakland’s exact proposal, but they suggest that a foreclosure-specific tax could change lenders’ bidding, sales and disposition decisions. 6

Because the tax would be calculated from fair-market value, it could also reduce the amount recovered from a foreclosure or be passed along to lenders, investors or sellers. The evidence does not show precisely who would pay in Oakland. It does, however, make clear that the entity legally responsible for the tax may not bear the entire burden. 7

Finally, gross receipts may not equal the measure’s net fiscal benefit. Foreclosed and bank-owned properties can affect other city revenues and create public costs. Those effects could offset some of the new tax money, but the available evidence does not quantify the balance for Oakland. 8