Greater U.S.-Denmark cooperation over Greenland will increase Greenland’s strategic and economic bargaining power

What's this about?

People disagree about whether closer ties with the United States and Denmark will give Greenland more power.

They ask if Greenland can win better deals for safety, jobs, money, and trade.

What supporters say

• Greenland’s place near the Arctic makes it key to U.S. safety plans, so it may trade access for jobs, roads, and money.
• New teamwork could bring cash and skills for ports, roads, phones, and travel links.
• Greenland’s rare earths and other key ores could bring new trade beyond fish and aid from Denmark.

What critics say

• Great powers may push Greenland to follow their plans instead of letting it choose its own path.
• Relying on money from other lands may leave Greenland with less power when it seeks better deals.
• Gains in safety may not bring jobs, growth, or wider gains for most people in Greenland.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; the stronger proof matters more.

The bottom line

Closer ties could help Greenland gain funds, new links, and more trade choices.

But proof remains thin, and strong outside powers may also bring more pressure and less freedom.

The claim is that closer cooperation among Greenland, Denmark and the United States could give Greenland more power to negotiate better security and economic terms. But strategic attention may also increase Greenland’s dependence on stronger outside powers rather than its control over decisions.

The case for

Greenland’s location makes it important to U.S. Arctic and North Atlantic security, including missile warning and space surveillance. The U.S. already has a major strategic presence at Pituffik. That importance could give Greenland something valuable to trade: access and cooperation in exchange for infrastructure, jobs, public revenue and political concessions. The idea is plausible, but it rests mainly on strategic reasoning rather than clear evidence that such cooperation has already improved Greenland’s negotiating position. 1

Closer cooperation could also help overcome the island’s severe infrastructure and logistical challenges. Greenland’s economy remains small and heavily concentrated in fisheries and public activity, while Arctic ports, communications and transport systems are expensive to build and maintain. Outside funding and technical expertise could improve connectivity and create more commercial options for Greenland. If the island could deal with a wider range of partners, its bargaining position would improve. 2 (see Figure 1)

Minerals offer another possible source of leverage. U.S. geological assessments point to deposits of rare earths and other critical minerals, which are increasingly important to major powers. If Greenland developed these resources responsibly and worked with several buyers rather than one dominant partner, it could diversify its economy beyond fisheries and Danish financial support. That could make its negotiating position stronger, although the evidence shows resource potential—not completed projects that have already delivered bargaining gains. 3 (see Figure 2)

The case against

Greater interest from Washington and Copenhagen could increase pressure on Greenland without giving Greenland more control. The island has extensive self-government, but it remains constitutionally linked to Denmark, which retains important responsibilities and provides financial support. Public demands for U.S. control illustrate the risk: strategic importance can lead powerful countries to seek control over territory and facilities, rather than offer an equal partnership. 4

Outside investment could also shift leverage toward investors. Major Arctic infrastructure and mining projects require large sums, difficult logistics, clear regulations and many years to develop. If only a few Danish or U.S. funders can provide that support, they may gain stronger influence over financing, ownership and project terms. Announcing cooperation does not prove that Greenland will receive enough ownership, revenue, jobs or alternative financing to avoid that dependence. 5 (see Figure 3)

Nor is there clear evidence that strategic cooperation would produce broad economic gains. Pituffik demonstrates Greenland’s value to the United States, but it does not show that closer cooperation would diversify the economy or create substantial benefits across local communities. Strategic projects may remain separate from the wider economy, leaving Greenland more important to outside powers without making its population broadly wealthier. 6

The bottom line

The evidence is balanced, and confidence is low. Greater U.S.–Danish cooperation could increase Greenland’s bargaining power if it expands the island’s choices, attracts several investors, and guarantees local participation, revenue, jobs and environmental protections.

But strategic attention alone is not enough. Exclusive financing, outside-controlled operations or demands for greater authority could instead deepen Greenland’s dependence on Washington and Copenhagen. Greenland’s existing self-government and relationships beyond the United States and Denmark offer possible alternatives, but its constitutional and financial ties to Denmark limit how freely it can use them.

Overall, the evidence supports the mechanisms behind the claim but does not establish that cooperation will deliver stronger bargaining power. The decisive issue is who controls the money, security arrangements and projects—and how much of the resulting value Greenland can retain.