U.S. export controls failed to stop China from producing sub-10 nm chips

What's this about?

People disagree about whether U.S. rules stopped China from making very small computer chips. China made at least one 7 nm chip, which is smaller than 10 nm.

What supporters say

• Huawei’s Mate 60 phone used a 7 nm-class chip made by China’s SMIC chip maker.
• This chip gives real proof that China made a chip below the 10 nm mark.
• SMIC used older DUV chip-making tools and extra steps to work around missing EUV tools.
• China may also use older tools, spare parts, stored supplies, and local firms to keep moving forward.

What critics say

• One working 7 nm chip does not prove China can make many such chips again and again.
• Extra chip-making steps take more time and work than EUV tools.
• We do not know if China can make these chips at low cost or in huge amounts.
• The U.S. made its rules tighter later, but tighter rules do not mean earlier rules did nothing.

The bottom line

U.S. rules did not fully stop China from making at least one sub-10 nm chip. But we still do not know if China can make these chips in large amounts, at low cost, and match top chip firms.

U.S. export controls did not prevent China from making at least one sub-10 nanometer chip. But the available evidence does not show that China can produce such chips reliably, cheaply and at the huge volumes needed to compete at the industry’s cutting edge.

The case for

The clearest evidence comes from Huawei’s Mate 60 smartphone. Technical examinations found that its Kirin 9000S processor was made by China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., or SMIC, using a 7 nm-class manufacturing process. That is direct evidence of a Chinese-made chip below the 10 nm threshold, not simply a company promise or future target. 1

The chip also showed that denying China access to the most advanced extreme-ultraviolet, or EUV, lithography machines did not close every path to advanced production. Reports indicate SMIC used older deep-ultraviolet, or DUV, equipment along with a complex technique called multiple patterning. This offered a workaround, even if it was less efficient than EUV-based manufacturing (see Figure 1). 2

China’s ability to keep moving forward may also reflect access to equipment obtained before restrictions, supplies of older tools, stockpiles of parts, domestic suppliers and other channels outside the most tightly controlled parts of the supply chain. These options can help firms make progress even when some key technologies are restricted (see Figure 3). 4

The policy record points in the same direction. The United States imposed major restrictions on advanced computing and chip-making equipment in 2022, then tightened them further in 2024. Those later steps do not prove the earlier rules had no effect. But they do suggest that earlier controls had not completely shut down China’s ability to make advanced chips. The Congressional Research Service said the Mate 60 episode showed that controls had not fully blocked Chinese advanced-chip production (see Figure 2). 3

The case against

A single successful 7 nm-class product is not the same as a lasting, large-scale manufacturing industry. Public evidence does not establish whether SMIC and Huawei can make these chips in high volumes, with good yields, at competitive prices, or on a repeatable basis. Reuters reported that U.S. officials lacked evidence Huawei could produce advanced smartphones in large quantities, while the Congressional Research Service also noted uncertainty over the scale and effectiveness of Chinese advanced-chip production. 5

China also remains constrained by foreign equipment, especially at the leading edge. ASML, the Dutch lithography company, has continued to face licensing restrictions on advanced shipments to China. And while DUV multiple patterning can produce smaller features, it is a more difficult and costly route than using EUV tools. 6

There is evidence that export controls have imposed real costs even where they have not delivered a total halt. Studies have found economic and innovation effects on Chinese firms, while the Center for Strategic and International Studies has concluded that controls can slow technological progress and raise its cost without permanently stopping it. 7

It is also misleading to treat U.S. policy as one unchanged set of restrictions stretching back to 2010. The broad, major controls discussed here began in 2022 and were expanded afterward. That makes it difficult to assign the Kirin 9000S result to one policy decision, rather than to a mix of earlier equipment purchases, loopholes, domestic adaptation and later rule changes. 8

The bottom line

The claim is true under a narrow definition of production capability: China did produce a functioning sub-10 nm-class chip. The Kirin 9000S is strong, physical evidence that U.S. controls did not stop every instance of advanced Chinese chip fabrication.

But the broader claim—that controls failed to prevent China from building a commercially competitive, high-volume and sustainable leading-edge chip industry—remains unproven. China has demonstrated advanced-node fabrication, yet still faces bottlenecks in equipment, manufacturing scale, yields and cost. The key unanswered question is not whether a 7 nm chip was made, but whether that achievement can be repeated at the volumes and economics required to rival the global leaders.