The expansion of executive power through emergency declarations poses a threat to democratic governance

What's this about?

People disagree about whether emergency powers give top leaders too much control over democracy. The danger depends on whether other groups can still set limits.

What supporters say

• During the pandemic, some governments broke democratic rules and limited people’s rights.
• Leaders who dislike democracy could use emergency powers to weaken rivals and avoid fair rules.
• Long or repeated emergencies can make special powers seem normal.
• Emergency orders can let leaders skip the usual lawmaking process and avoid checks from lawmakers.

What critics say

• Courts and lawmakers sometimes stop leaders when emergency actions go too far.
• Emergency plans can include real safety rules, time limits, reports, and outside checks.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; strong proof matters more than a long list.

The bottom line

Emergency powers create a serious risk to democracy, but they do not always cause harm. The risk grows when courts, lawmakers, and other groups cannot enforce limits.

The expansion of executive power during emergencies can put democratic governance at risk, but it does not do so automatically. The evidence points to a serious but conditional threat: much depends on whether legislatures, courts and other institutions can enforce limits.

The case for

Emergency declarations can move lawmaking and policy implementation away from legislatures and toward the executive. International IDEA has warned that concentrated executive lawmaking can upset the separation of powers. In the United States, government analyses show that emergency declarations can activate wide-ranging statutory powers, even when notification and reporting requirements remain in place. The concern is not simply that presidents act quickly, but that emergency authority can replace ordinary legislative bargaining when lawmakers lack the ability—or the political will—to end it. 1

There is also direct evidence that emergency responses can coincide with violations of democratic standards and individual rights. Comparative research on the COVID-19 pandemic found such violations in several countries. International IDEA likewise documented restrictions and institutional disruptions affecting democracy and human rights. One comparative study found no relationship between violations of democratic standards and COVID-19 death rates, weakening the argument that reduced accountability was necessarily justified by better public-health results. 2

Long emergencies may also change what citizens and institutions consider normal. The Brennan Center has recorded 55 U.S. national-emergency declarations since 1978. Scholars have warned that sunset clauses and other expiration rules may not prevent the routine renewal of emergency powers when oversight is weak. The number of declarations alone does not prove democratic damage, but repeated renewals support the concern that exceptional authority can gradually become ordinary. 3

Emergency powers can also give anti-democratic leaders opportunities to weaken political norms. Research on pandemic-era democratic backsliding found that governments used emergency authority in different ways. Abuse depended on the conduct of incumbents and the strength of political institutions, rather than following automatically from every declaration. That makes emergency power a vulnerability that can be exploited, not a guaranteed path to democratic decline. 4

The case against

Emergency frameworks can contain important safeguards. Laws may require governments to notify legislatures, allow lawmakers to end an emergency through expedited procedures, impose time limits and periodic reviews, and provide access to courts. Comparative democratic standards also emphasize legality, necessity, proportionality, temporary measures, parliamentary oversight, judicial review and legal remedies. These protections make the broad claim that emergency declarations necessarily threaten democracy too strong. 5

Courts and legislatures have sometimes limited emergency action. A comparative study of courts during the COVID-19 crisis found substantial variation in how judges reviewed emergency measures adopted by executives and legislatures. That variation suggests that resilient courts can contain abuses rather than simply accepting expanded executive power. Still, judicial effectiveness differs sharply among countries, so this evidence challenges the idea of inevitability more than it disproves the existence of a serious risk. 6

Formal protections, however, may not work in practice if lawmakers defer to the executive, courts lack independence or renewals become routine. The key question is therefore not only whether safeguards appear in legal texts, but whether institutions are willing and able to use them.

The bottom line

The evidence favours the claim that emergency declarations pose a serious threat to democratic governance, but only conditionally and with moderate confidence. The case for concern is stronger on the existence of institutional risks and documented democratic violations. The opposing evidence is also meaningful: legal safeguards, legislative oversight and judicial review can limit those risks.

Emergency powers may improve a government’s ability to respond quickly to crises while weakening accountability when their scope, duration or oversight becomes excessive. The research does not show that every declaration causes lasting democratic decline. It also cannot fully separate the effects of emergency powers from pre-existing institutional weakness, the actions of particular leaders or the crisis itself. The decisive issue is whether democratic institutions enforce their safeguards effectively in the political circumstances of each emergency.