European countries should prioritize domestic or EU-based defence procurement over buying from foreign suppliers

What's this about?

People disagree about whether Europe should buy most defense gear from its own countries or from foreign sellers.

Foreign sellers may offer faster help, while European buying may make future supply safer.

What supporters say

• EU countries could join their orders, avoid waste, and stop each country from buying tiny amounts alone.
• A strong European defense industry could keep useful skills, tools, plants, and tech ready for future wars.
• Buying from Europe could make parts, ammo, repairs, and secure links easier to get during a long fight.

What critics say

• Foreign sellers may send urgent tools and gear faster than European makers can.
• Buying foreign-made gear may help allied forces use the same tools and work well together.
• Favoring European firms could cut down the number of firms that compete for orders.

How to read this

The number of points on each side does not show who is right; the strength of each point matters more.

The bottom line

The facts support a careful choice for European buying, not a strict rule.

Europe should work together and buy at home when supply safety matters, but still choose foreign gear when it works better or arrives sooner.

European governments face a choice between strengthening their own defence industries and buying from foreign suppliers that may offer faster delivery or better-established systems. The evidence supports a conditional preference for European procurement, not a blanket rule.

The case for

A stronger European defence industry could make military supply chains more reliable. Dependence on outside suppliers leaves governments vulnerable to export controls, political pressure and disruptions, especially for ammunition, spare parts and maintenance. European procurement can help preserve production capacity and ensure that supplies can be replaced during a prolonged conflict. 1

The case is strongest when countries buy together rather than simply favouring their own national companies. European defence markets remain fragmented, with governments often ordering small quantities from separate suppliers. Joint purchasing can combine demand, reduce duplication and help close capability gaps. EU programmes such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act are designed to do this. They aim to create larger orders while improving compatibility between European forces.

That distinction matters. European cooperation can create scale; national protectionism can deepen fragmentation. Common programmes may also preserve engineering skills, factories and technology that could be vital in a future war, when the ability to replenish and adapt equipment may matter as much as the first purchase. Bruegel’s analysis supports stronger production capacity and more predictable demand, while warning that industrial policy must still protect military effectiveness, competition and public finances. 2

European sourcing therefore has its clearest strategic value in critical areas such as munitions, maintenance and secure communications. In these sectors, a supply interruption or dependence on a foreign government could carry unusually high costs. A stronger European industry can also support long-term military capabilities and keep technological options open. 3

The case against

The main problem is time. European suppliers may not have the required equipment, production scale or delivery speed when governments face an urgent threat. The war in Ukraine exposed bottlenecks in allied defence industries, while European readiness assessments found a gap between immediate military needs and the time needed to expand domestic production. Since 2022, European countries have made substantial purchases from non-European suppliers, reflecting both rapid delivery requirements and capability shortages in Europe. 4 (see Figure 2)

A preference for European suppliers could also reduce competition and value for money. Closed markets can raise prices, protect inefficient producers and leave governments paying for duplicated production lines. The evidence for this concern is weaker than the case for resilience, but it remains an important warning: industrial support should not become automatic protection for every European supplier. 5

Foreign systems can also offer practical advantages for cooperation with allies. Countries already using the same platforms may share training, spare parts, logistics, data links and operating procedures more easily. Interoperability is not guaranteed simply because forces buy the same equipment, but established allied systems can provide benefits that a European alternative may not match within the necessary timeframe. 6

Nor can European procurement make supply completely sovereign. Modern defence production often depends on multinational supply chains, foreign components, intellectual property and political decisions about exports. Buying from Europe may reduce some risks without eliminating them.

The bottom line

The evidence favours a conditional European preference, but only with low confidence. It provides a stronger strategic case for building European resilience and coordinating demand than for requiring European origin in every purchase.

Governments should favour domestic or EU-based suppliers where they strengthen critical supply chains, preserve long-term production capacity or benefit from joint European orders. They should still buy from foreign suppliers when capabilities are scarce, delivery is urgent, allied interoperability is especially valuable or competition produces a clearly better result. EU-level coordination is more convincing than purely national preference (see Figure 1).

The available research establishes the main trade-offs but does not provide a common way to compare resilience, readiness, interoperability and cost across all types of equipment. The evidence is stronger on the strategic rationale and purchasing trends than on direct comparisons between specific European and foreign systems. The right policy therefore depends on the capability, market and timetable—not on a universal rule that European-made equipment always delivers better security.